In Clausewitzian terms, war is a contest, a complex, interactive duel between two opponents. This work begins by examining what it and its case studies mean by adaptation. This observation has proven increasingly true throughout the course of the twentieth century, in small wars as well as major conflicts, and there is every reason to believe it will continue to be true in the twenty-first century. Consequently, one of the foremost attributes of military effectiveness must lie in the ability of armies, navies, or air forces to recognize and adapt to the actual conditions of combat, as well as to the new tactical, operational, and strategic, not to mention political, challenges that war inevitably throws up. As Michael Howard has suggested, military organizations inevitably get the next war wrong, mostly for reasons that lie beyond their control. The problem of adaptation in war represents one of the most persistent, yet rarely examined problems that military institutions confront.
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